USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

PREVENTING SHOCKING AWE: THE CHALLENGE AFTER VICTORY

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ABSTRACT

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The Army Field Manual on leadership defines the attributes of a strategic leader in clear terms. Stability and reconstruction operations require many of those attributes. While it is very convenient to leave the job of stability and reconstruction to the military, this role should be limited to the military (primarily Army) core competencies, namely providing a secure environment for stability and reconstruction operations. When wielding all elements of national power, it is not efficient to exclude Government and non-government organizations that are better suited for these operations. The military plays a significant role in post-conflict operations, and will continue to do so in the future. Because of this, the roles and missions of the military and government organizations must be identified to minimize cost and maximize efficiency in stability and reconstruction operations. Even if the proper participants are identified, resourced, and trained, the ability to define stability and measure progress toward stability is lacking. This paper touches on strategic roles of governmental agencies, measures of effectiveness and merit for stability operations, and introduces a tool to track stability within a region.

PREVENTING SHOCKING AWE: THE CHALLENGE AFTER VICTORY

> Strategic leaders are not only experts in their own domain – warfighting and leading large military organizations – but also are astute in the departmental and political environments of the nation's decision-making process. They're expected to deal competently with the public sector, the executive branch, and the legislature. The complex national security environment requires an in-depth knowledge of the political, economic, informational, and military elements of national power as well as the interrelationship among them.
>
> - FM 22-100, Chapter 7, Paragraph 7-1.

<u>Background</u>

The Army Field Manual on leadership defines the attributes of a strategic leader in clear terms. Stability and reconstruction operations require many of the same attributes. While it is very convenient to leave the job of stability and reconstruction to the military, this role should be limited to the military (primarily Army) core competencies, namely providing a secure environment for stability and reconstruction operations. When wielding all elements of national power, it is not efficient to exclude Government and non-government organizations that are better suited for these operations. The military plays a significant role in post-conflict operations, and will continue to do so in the future. Because of this, the roles and missions of the military and government organizations must be identified to minimize cost and maximize efficiency in stability and reconstruction operations. The current interagency assets are not sufficient to support these operations. Even if the proper participants are identified, resourced, and trained, the ability to define stability and measure progress toward stability is lacking. This paper touches on strategic roles of governmental agencies, measures of effectiveness and merit for stability operations, and introduces a tool to track stability within a region.

Operations in Iraq and Afghanistan highlight the importance of stability operations to the achievement of national objectives. The initial planning for both operations focused on the combat operations. Military and government leaders realized the impact of the failure to fully coordinate and resource efforts following the end of major combat operations. As a result, all agencies have been working diligently to overcome this planning shortfall. Great strides have been made in the areas of objective development, establishment of useful measures of effectiveness, and assessment of progress in both regions by deployed agencies and military forces. Although progress continues to improve the process, there are some approaches that may improve the ability to plan, execute, and assess operations following hostilities. The nation cannot afford, both in lives and dollars, the cost of not defining stability after military operations, identifying how progress is going to be measured, and when success has been achieved.

New approaches are being developed daily by the military and government agencies. Many of these solutions are captured in the lessons learned files of each organization. But, for the time being, many of the great ideas are quietly being implemented. The ideas put forward in this paper may already be in-place but not publicized. Regardless, the ideas captured in the lessons learned files from all organizations should be gathered and reviewed at one central location. These files most likely contain the keys to interagency interaction, planning, and execution.

<u>Foundations</u>

The concept of reconstructing nations after conflict is relatively new. Although there was reconstruction in the South following the Civil War, the effort was internal and executed to repair the nation. Although there were modest efforts in reconstruction after World War I, the reconstruction that took place after World War II was far more extensive than anything in previous history. The international efforts to rebuild both Germany and Japan were highly successful, but proved time consuming and expensive. Since these efforts were so successful, there is a desire to apply the same process to current situations. The environment in Germany and Japan following their unconditional surrender is significantly different from situations in the foreseeable future. Therefore, the lessons learned in World War II can guide development of future plans, but should not be viewed as the de facto solution. The most important fact to take from the reconstruction of Germany and Japan is the advanced planning that started in 1942. During this time, many leaders in the military had corporate and government backgrounds. Although the effort was not truly interagency, the diversity of the military leaders provided an understanding of the use of interagency capabilities. Still, the process took more than eight years to establish true stability in each country.

Along with the planning for reconstruction after World War II, theorists in Britain also addressed the concept of the reconstruction efforts defining national goals. Basil Liddell Hart's theories on the transition to peace after war and the impact of the war on the resulting peace provide today's leaders with concepts for successful use of the country's elements of power. Liddell-Hart's writings did not have a large influence on strategists outside Britain. Even though he introduced the idea of reconstruction and developing a stable environment, Liddell-Hart did not discuss measures of success for transition to peace after war. Ultimately, defining these measures at the outset of the planning cycle will help to establish the foundations for a successful exit strategy. A second order effect is wasted effort and increased cost of undertaking projects that do not contribute to the stability of a country.

Looking at recent operations in the Middle East, the US failure to define fully the measures of successful peace for both operations created missed opportunities and costly failures. In all fairness to the current administration, precisely focused efforts in Afghanistan as they have developed resulted in fewer wasted efforts. Unfortunately, this was not a function of omniscient planning. This was due in part to the geographic separation of the Taliban and in part to the political goals of stabilizing four key regions in Afghanistan. Meticulous targeting and precision weapons reduced the amount of damage to the infrastructure in Afghanistan, but stabilization and reconstruction still requires both time and money. "Current estimates of the costs of helping Afghanistan range from US $5-6 Billion over 5 years to US $25 Billion over a decade."[1] Operations in Iraq were more widespread, resulting in operational and collateral damage throughout the country. The use of precision weapons also minimized damage to the infrastructure in Iraq, but military objectives still outweighed long-term strategic objectives. Critical infrastructure destroyed during the Shock and Awe phase of the operation was the first thing that had to be repaired to promote stabilization. Allied forces crippled the communications infrastructure in the country to prevent the command and control of the Iraqi forces. When forces are in harm's way, military priorities should take precedence. However, the phone lines were also imperative for stabilization operations. The reforming government could not communicate reliably, creating the problem of both misinformation and slow progress.[2] The solution to this problem was the establishment of an extensive cell phone network. This network was an additional cost, as the phone system still requires repair. Thus, the failure to align the goals in Iraq did cost more, in both money and time. Ultimately, the slow progress created an environment conducive to the fomentation of insurgents.

<u>Roles and Missions</u>

The situation our nation is facing in Iraq and Afghanistan foreshadows future strategic challenges. These events are not anomalies, nor are they a result of cultural deficiencies. It is actually a function of increased information flow. As information becomes more available, people see how others live and establish expectations for their own lives. Ubiquitous media coverage has changed the expectations of the world and individuals from those countries. They, as do the people of the United States, expect rapid and measurable progress toward stability and reconstruction. The media focuses on errors in interagency coordination and execution, but they fail to identify the true problem. The identification of the roles and missions of the military and other government agencies is the true problem.[3]

During the Cold War, the force-sizing construct for the military was the ability to conduct two nearly simultaneous wars against near-peer competitors. The construct also defined the mission sets for the military. In 2000, the force-sizing construct changed to the ability to defend the homeland, deter in four critical regions, execute two swiftly defeat the efforts operations with the ability to shift one of those operations to a win decisive campaign, and the ability to conduct several lesser contingencies. The shorthand for this construct is known as the 1-4-2-1 strategy and it guides the development of the joint military force of the United States. While this is not a strategy per se, it does influence both the budget and composition of our military. This shift in focus increased the responsibility of the military and introduced serious challenges for the force.

The largest challenge is the conduct of post-conflict stability and reconstruction operations. The core competency of the military is the conduct of combat operations against all threats to the United States. In this competency, the United States military is without peer in the world. Precision weapons, stealth technology, and level of training allow the military to conduct large operations with fewer people. The negative side to this trend is the fact that stability and reconstruction operations still require many people.[4] The military does not have the structure or size to conduct these operations without external help. However, the United States has many of the capabilities required for reconstruction operations within current agencies, though the quantity of these capabilities is not sufficient to support the National Security Strategy. The combination of military and government capabilities, coupled with clearly identified roles and missions, may provide the ability to conduct stability and reconstruction operations in countries following military conflict with proper resourcing.

Stability operations and reconstruction operations are two distinctly different actions. Stability operations create the environment for the execution of reconstruction operations. Furthermore, there are two levels of stability operations: establishment of security and maintenance of stability. The establishment of security is primarily a military mission and must be completed within a region before any stability and reconstruction can happen. The maintenance of stability is a joint and interagency operation, requiring additional capabilities not widely available to the military.[5] Reconstruction operations focus on the rebuilding of the infrastructure of the country, coupled with the reforming of the indigenous government, military, and police forces. The crux of the problem is the limited capabilities of the military to execute reconstruction operations and the lack of organizational focus of government agencies to plan for and rapidly deploy personnel in support of these operations.

Although government agencies can provide the necessary assistance to rebuild the indigenous government, they are constrained by both budget and personnel. Adding to the

problem, there is no central control and management of the existing agency capabilities. The daily task of the government agencies is to run the country. As a result, any response to a crisis involves an ad hoc organization of response teams and resources.[6] This gap, the deployment gap, presents a problem in the execution of reconstruction operations.

The genesis of the challenge is the proper identification of roles and missions of all government organizations in support of stability and reconstruction operations. The remainder of this paper will identify proposed roles for the military and government agencies. The scope of the roles will be limited to the strategic level. Defining operational and tactical roles for the 56 pages of tasks identified by the Department of State would require a much longer essay. The sheer number of tasks provides another argument for identifying and assigning roles for each agency.

The core competency of ground forces is the ability to establish and maintain a safe and secure environment.[7] As noted in a recent report to Congress, "Though every case is different, there is one constant—if security needs are not met, both the peace in a given country and the intervention intended to promote it are doomed to fail."[8] This ground-centric focus does not diminish the contribution of other services in stability operations. Each Service provides required capabilities to these operations and serves as an integral part of the joint force.

To address the role of the military in stability and reconstruction operations, the Office of the Secretary of Defense created the draft Department of Defense (DoD) Directive 3000cc that identifies the roles of the Services, Combatant Commanders, and the Office of the Secretary of Defense in stability and reconstruction operations. Previous draft versions identified the Army as the executive agent for stability operations, but the published directive does not name an executive agent.[9] Unfortunately, the directive was not been fully coordinated with other government agencies. The internal nature of DOD Directive 3000cc ensures failure unless the military creates a structure dedicated to stability and reconstruction operations. Such a structure mandates a shift of military core competencies at the cost of maintaining a force capable of defeating near-peer competitors. The challenge of winning the war, stability and reconstruction operations, should be a US Government core competency.

Establishment of the roles and missions within DoD is a first step in creating a codified response team for operations following conflict. However, the current campaign phasing does not address the simultaneous nature of stability operations. The non-linear, non-contiguous battlespace demands a flexible response to permit decisive operations in one region while forces conduct stability operations in another region. Just as importantly, the stilted campaign phasing creates problems with the interagency process. A solution to the campaign phasing

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problem is the identification of lines of operation that overlap and address all the participating agencies. Since lines of operation are not currently addressed in joint doctrine, the concepts in this paper will be framed with the current campaign construct. The new joint phasing construct will be covered in the following section.

Given the congressional cap on military personnel, the military must identify a subset of stability and reconstruction capabilities and coordinate the scope of these activities with other government agencies. The military, in coordination with government agencies, should limit reconstruction operations to the foundation level of Maslow's hierarchy of needs. As such, the military would be responsible for delivery of food, emergency medical capabilities, and temporary shelter for a specific length of time not to exceed 30 days. The finite timeline for providing these capabilities has two impacts. First, the military can better focus training and resources to this mission. Second, government agencies can optimize the required capability sets needed for stability and reconstruction operations and plan for the rapid deployment of those capabilities.

Fortunately, the potential capability sets available in existing government agencies are sufficient to conduct reconstruction operations. But, even though many of the capabilities exist in the current government structure, they lack the mission and resources to deploy in a timely manner. As previously stated, the roles and missions of these agencies in stability and reconstruction operations have not been formally identified.[10] Since the agencies do not know what their tasks are, they cannot allocate capabilities and training to develop mission competency. The day-to-day execution of responsibilities of running the government precludes these agencies from planning for expeditionary operations. As a result, the agencies respond to crises rather than proactively developing contingency plans in concert with DoD.[11] Furthermore, the resources and funding for these operations are gathered in an ad hoc fashion during the initial stages of the crisis. Congress must develop the quantity of capability sets with the ability to rapidly deploy to trouble spots in order to support the requirements of the National Secrity Strategy.

Government agencies do not have the personnel or the ability to establish security in a region; that mission falls to the military. However, the agencies must be a proactive part of the establishment of the criteria for designating an area secure. Each agency develops the criteria for entering a secure area without coordination with DoD.[12] This common definition of security is necessary – military commanders cannot conduct their security mission without this agreement. When the bulk of the forces are coalition forces, the necessity of a common definition is even more critical.

Government agencies do not have standing organizations ready to deploy in the event of a crisis.[13] There have been many attempts to remedy this shortfall following the 9-11 terrorist attacks to include Senate Bill 209. The bill establishes the requirement for government agencies to create and maintain an expeditionary response force. This bill aside, most of the attempts involve creating new organizations within the government by dissecting existing agencies. The resulting agencies are under-manned and not resourced. A related problem lies in the identification of the roles of existing agencies in stability and reconstruction operations. Unfortunately, developing an expeditionary team before identifying the unique roles and missions of each agency is counter-productive.

Many politicians and military leaders have stated that a Goldwater-Nichols act is needed for government agencies. In addition to this act, the Office of Force Transformation and the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) advocate a military force designed for stability operations. While these are potential solutions, there are several factors that make these options less than optimal.

First, the structure of the National Security Council (NSC) and Policy Coordination Committees support the execution of stability and reconstruction operations throughout the world as defined in the National Security Presidential Document (NSPD) – 1.[14] The only thing they are lacking is empowerment: the authority to direct government agencies to act in support of the operation. This has not always been the case; the NSC enjoyed a certain amount of empowerment under President Clinton and Presidential Decision Document 56.[15] The provisions of this directive were not continued under the current administration, leading to struggle among agencies for both power and resources. A new law is not needed to make this structure work: the President must empower the National Security Council to manage cross-agency operations in a document more definitive than NSPD-1. The publication of NSPD-44 provides a good foundation for definition of roles and missions. However, the scope and timing of the document does not guarantee success. The President must enforce the provisions of NSPD-44 and provide funding for the assigned missions.

Second, each crisis is unique and requires different sets of capabilities.[16] Therefore, a specialized stability and reconstruction force will not suffice. A better solution is the one the Army is implementing with the modularization of brigade units.[17] The modular force is not designed solely for stability operations but does have the expanded capabilities to execute those operations. However, the larger problem with a specialized force is the number of times the unit will be deployed.

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In fact, developing two such units immediately create a low density, high demand unit. While the rest of the Army deploys with a rotation ratio of 4 to 1[18], these units would deploy with a ratio of 1 to 1. This ratio is defined by the number of units required to support one unit that is deployed. Basic math shows that maintaining specialized units are not feasible in the 21st Century. Based on the Army's 3 to 1 rotation goal and a division-sized stability force, one contingency would require four divisions for stability and reconstruction operations. Our national force sizing construct states that we must be able to respond to two swiftly defeat the efforts operations, resulting in a total requirement of 8 divisions of stability operations forces. In a ten division Army, that leaves two divisions to execute the warfight – an unacceptable risk.[19]

Third, developing new organizations within the government require time, money, and additional personnel. Creating new structure actually increases the bureaucracy and leads to an entirely new set of problems. A new organization goes through a growth process – a time at which they are not efficient and effective. FEMA is facing this problem in light of the recent hurricane season. The changes made last year to the organizational structure were not sufficient nor complete enough to address the unique problems caused by Hurricane Katrina. Even worse, the development of new organizational structure actually masks the actual problem. After a failure, the structure of the organization is scrutinized and scapegoats identified. Meanwhile, the true source of the problems remains untouched. A new interagency organization will face similar problems, attempting to be proactive without having credibility within the bureaucracy.

Fourth, the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Act worked for the military because the basic structure had been in place for at least 39 years. After 19 years, the military is still working to fully implement the spirit of the Act to field a joint force. The captive audience of a disciplined military structure allowed the Goldwater-Nichols Act to succeed.[20] Government agencies do not have this legacy or captive audience which increases the difficulty of implementing changes. The lack of historical perspective, coupled with the competition for resources in the annual budget, sets the act up for failure during execution.[21]

The basic stability and reconstruction capabilities exist within the United States Government but not in sufficient quantity. The precise roles and missions must be identified for each agency prior to any law requiring agencies to work together. Additionally, the resources and funding streams must be created to support the organizational roles and missions. Once the roles and funding have been identified, the President must empower the National Security Council to be the executive agent for interagency cooperation. A Goldwater-Nichols type act will not solve the problems without first identifying the definitive roles and missions of each of

the agencies. Finally, the National Security Strategy must address the challenges of stability and reconstruction in terms of interagency roles.

<u>Measures of Success</u>

Often, the mission of stability and reconstruction following conflict falls to the United States due to its role as a super power. This is even more important when the United States is the principal participant in hostilities. Therefore, there is no excuse for lack of planning for the stabilization and eventual exit from the country. The exit strategy must be tied closely with the definition of stability for the country in question. Prior to identifying the exit strategy, the government must understand the parameters of stability as it pertains to that country. This is beyond the role of the military. The stabilization of a country requires a coordinated and continuous effort from all elements of national power. Hence, the US government needs a central planning organization that is able to integrate all agencies and maximize the contribution of non-government organizations.

Planning and execution of stability and reconstruction operations can be divided into phases just as military operations are planned and executed. In fact, Joint doctrine provides a framework for campaign phasing. Basically there are three states in a campaign. Pre-hostilities encompass all actions up to the firing of the first shot. Phase 0, which is *Shaping*, and Phase I, *Deter*, are part of pre-hostilities. The state of the campaign changes from pre-hostilities to hostilities after the first shots are fired. Phase II, *Seize the Initiative*, and Phase III, *Dominate*, are part of the hostilities portion of the campaign. Finally, Phase IV, *Stabilize*, and Phase V, *Transfer to Civilian Control*, describe the post-hostilities portion of the campaign. This phasing construct provides a useful framework to discuss objectives, planning, and execution of stability and reconstruction operations.

The United Nations is an organization that is suited for the long-term peace and stabilization efforts. They have had ongoing missions over the last 40 years, displaying great endurance. They do, however, lack firm and achievable exit strategies [22]. Advocates of the UN approach say that it is counterproductive to create an exit strategy because it is bound to change. Others correctly cite the fact that a poor plan is better than none at all. The changing world has raised the ante on our actions. We cannot afford to go into situations without a plan, nor can we go into situations with a bad plan. The worst aspect of not having a plan is not being able to be able to define success. Failure to know when you have either succeeded or failed is a result of not having distinct and measurable factors to determine stability in a region.

A campaign has two levels of success. The first, and arguably most time sensitive, is success in military operations. The US military has honed their skills and capabilities and have become very proficient in providing military success. The strategic success, or national success, is defined by how we handle the situation outside of full-scale conflict. This encompasses actions conducted before, during and after conflict. Unlike military success, defined by the achieving of a series of definitive objectives, strategic success is better defined by a series of indicators viewed over time. Assessing stability operations is a challenge because the metrics of importance are often softer, qualitative measures rather than quantitative data normally collected during a campaign.

Stability in a region is difficult to define in terms of quantitative data. To be successful, one must determine the appropriate end state prior before the conflict. The status of the environment, government, and status quo all factor into the definition of stability in the region. Economy alone does not create or preclude stability. Government, specifically a military dictatorship, often provides a stable environment for the population but fails to address the needs of the people. The status of human rights, the form of government, and the separation of the social classes create an illusion of instability to the international community because they do not fit within the social norms. Identifying and codifying this illusion is critical for successful stability operations.

The action of a foreign country, either by force or by other national power, on another country creates instability. When force is used to alter the country itself, such as regime change, the path to a new stability becomes more difficult. Returning to the status quo is not an option to foster stability and a new definition for stability must be created for each situation. So, defining stability optimally should happen during the planning and definitely prior to any operation. The Department of State and USAID have the models and capabilities to establish criteria for stability. Therefore, the planning of any military operation requires early coordination with the Department of State to align all elements of national power toward the achievement of stability in the region. This early cooperation is confounded by the sensitivity of war planning. Releasing actual plans to agencies outside of the Department of Defense increases the risk of compromise. However sensitive, the Secretary of Defense must formally include other agencies in the planning process and not present military plans as fait accomplis. Ultimately, military action in a country creates challenges for each and every governmental agency.

When another country tries to change a society, that very society loses a sense of security. In a very basic sense, stable countries require the individual needs defined by Maslow.[23] Maslow further described the needs as either deficiency or growth needs. The

distinction is important when applying this model to stability operations. Physiological needs and physical safety are deficiencies – things that are lacking in a society that prevent the achievement of stability. Belonging, esteem, and actualization are growth needs and are the focus of identifying trends in stability.

The lowest level of needs are physiological – food, water, and shelter. No need listed above the first level can be fully achieved without first satisfying the physiological needs. It does not mean that efforts to provide the other needs cannot be done at the same time. But, the effect of improvements in those areas will not satisfy the expectations of the citizens. The military can conduct a small subset of these missions, but civilian and non-governmental agencies are better suited to accomplish these tasks. Defining measures for the physiological needs are fairly straight forward and quantitative. The United Nations has data and formulas for computing these basic needs and methods for tracking progress. The problem with the use of Maslow's hierarchy is that, in times of conflict, the safety needs must be fulfilled prior to complete fulfillment of the physiological needs. Ultimately, this problem translates to potential problems with the achievement of national goals.

The problem that forces face now in Iraq is similar to the age old question of "Which came first, the chicken or the egg?" This dilemma, translated to "Which should we do first, security or physiological needs?" The answer to this question is fairly straight forward in theory, but very difficult in practice. The United States military can provide some of the humanitarian, or physiological, needs, other government and non-government organizations are better suited to provide. The military, on the other hand, is the only organization that can provide security. The answer, therefore, is for the military to establish security while distributing the absolute minimum physiological needs of food and water. The focus on creating a secure environment sets the conditions for increased non-governmental participation. The important message in this approach is the importance of managing indigenous and American expectations.

The establishment of security in a region is critical for the creation of a safe environment. This deficiency must be rectified or stability cannot be established. Security impacts the situation in two ways. First, security is one of the basic needs in Maslow's hierarchy of needs. The society is a group of individuals, all of which are trying to fulfill their basic needs. Maslow asserts that the meeting of needs must start at the bottom. Therefore, the basic needs must be met before any other changes affect the situation. Second, security of the people is a fundamental responsibility of a legitimate government. Therefore, the failure to establish a secure environment, as defined by the population, prevents the acceptance of any government as a legitimate body. The focus of the population is their individual basic needs required to

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make it through the next day. Successful stability operations must provide these needs through a functioning local, regional, and national government.


FIGURE 1 - MASLOW'S ORIGINAL HIERARCHY OF NEEDS

The measures, indicators, and factors that describe Maslow's growth needs are more qualitative than quantitative. Trends, social sciences, and diplomatic actions are difficult to measure, but they define progress toward strategic success. Moreover, the country's reactions to stimuli are not linear or symmetric. An example of non-linear response is how the population reacts to positive news and negative news. Good news must be transmitted to the public often and in many different formats. Measuring the effect of the good news is nearly impossible without extensive polling. Bad news, however, travels through the population by word of mouth.[24] This process is very quick and often produces immediate, measurable results. Current operations in Iraq provide a perfect example of this phenomenon. Scandals such as prison abuse eclipsed the coalition efforts to provide electricity, build schools, and increased security in a matter of hours.

The tendency of governmental leaders is to capture, track, and display every piece of data that can be collected. The State Department's tracking tool for Iraq, for example, contains over 500 individual data points.[25] The amount of data, however, does not guarantee that an accurate assessment can be made. In fact, too much data may cloud the true trends that the analysts are trying to identify.[26] Even worse, the data collected may have limited impact on stability in

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the region. Furthermore, the applicability of the data collected is dependent on whether the long-term or short-term effects are being assessed. The time frame affects more that just the data, it affects how often the data must be collected and analyzed. These are factors that should be addressed and resolved during the planning of campaigns to assure the availability of collection assets and personnel. The true art is to identify a few key indicators that signal the progress toward success and use those to assess the overall campaign.

Identifying trends does not have to be a time consuming and manpower intensive process. This approach has been applied in the medical community. The emergency room at Cook County Hospital started applying an algorithm for chest pain patients that included only four elements. The algorithm was an outstanding success, improving initial diagnoses by up to 15% to a 95% success rate.[27] Likewise, several simple indicators can show trends in a region during stability operations.

The two proposed areas for trend analysis are the rule of law and the economy. These two areas correspond to the growth indicators defined by Maslow, although elements of the rule of law apply to the security needs. Establishing a baseline, tracking measures of performance in each of these areas, and evaluation of the population's expectations will show the progress toward stability in a region. Although the plethora of other data is useful to staffs, leaders need a means to assess the campaign without being overloaded with trivial data.

The rule of law in a region goes beyond the measures of violence. It encompasses the efficiency of the legal system, the internalization of the spirit of the law by the population, trust in the legal system, and legitimacy of the police force. The level of violence serves as a measure of performance, but far less important than the perception of the population. A truer method of tracking the rule of law is a combination of statistics from the police and court system with extensive polling of people from all regions. Figure 2 shows a method for capturing measures of merit, measures of effectiveness, and measures of performance. These data points serve as examples of how little data it takes to create an assessment of progress for the senior leader. The other data collected is important for country teams and operations in the area, but do not contribute much to the assessment of stability. The theme of the questions should be about their trust in the legal system and perception of day-to-day safety. These perceptions will change over time and must be tracked by occupying forces. However, the polling should be accomplished by a disinterested third party. So, given this, the third party should be identified during TSC and start developing a baseline.

Measure of Merit	Measures of Performance

People believe in the spirit of the law and trust the law enforcement system	• Number Police Trained
	• % First Year Officers
	• # Successful Operations
	   • With Coalition Help
	   • Without Direct Coalition Support
	• # Total Operations
	• % Equipment Fill
	• # Successful Cases
	• # Trained Judges
	• # Active Courts
	• Average time required for trial
	• # Cases per month
	• # Bribes Identified
	• # Bribery Arrests
	• # Human Rights Violations
	• # Brought to Trial

Measures of Effectiveness • Efficiency of Police Force • Effective Court System • Low Rate of Corruption • Human Rights Observance • Freedom of Movement • Perception of Legitimacy	**Polling Results** • Perception of Freedoms • Perception of Safety • Trust in Legal System • Ability to File Complaints

FIGURE 2

The economy is easier to measure. Measures of performance are tied to availability of goods, trade, income, spending, and new growth. There are other less obvious measures that also indicate the viability of the economy in a region. The British track the types of goods available, prices, and demand on a daily basis in local markets. This information, combined with polling data, provides an acceptable measure of the satisfaction and ability to meet the expectations of the people. The measure of merit for the economy has two parts. The first is the perception of the people's prosperity. The second is the viability of the economy in the international market. Both of these measures of merit are focused on long-term results. Therefore, the collection of the majority of the data on the economy may be limited to monthly assessments.

These measures of effectiveness require a legitimate and functioning government to effectively contribute to a stable environment. Each of these measures can exist without a functioning government, but the combination of the two requires a government focused on creating a stable environment for the entire country. Therefore, measuring the rule of law and the economy provides a means to assess the evolving government. Additionally, the measure of the economy is tied to infrastructure growth and ultimately the status of reconstruction efforts. Furthermore, as the economy grows, the country gains international respect and autonomy. Ultimately, there is one measure of performance that provides an indicator of stability in a region. The accidental death and dismemberment insurance policy rates for contractors in the region serve as a good indicator of stability.

Insurance companies such as Lloyd's of London and AIG provide insurance policies for contractors in both stable and unstable regions. The US Government provides coverage for US contractors, at a rate of 18-25% of the annual payroll. Many contractors, to recruit people, offer additional coverage. In 2004, the coverage costs for this additional insurance increased 30%-40% across all insurance providers.[28] The costs are prohibitive, and change on a monthly basis following risk assessment updates by each of the insurance companies. The companies use proprietary methods for assessing risk and it would be beneficial for the government to have access to those risk assessments. However, a monthly monitoring of insurance costs from just two of the major providers will show the stability trends in a region.

The progress of stability operations in not only difficult to measure, the data needed to measure progress is perishable. One of the key measures for stability operations is the perception of the population. This perception changes over time and the metrics must reflect these changes. Developing the baseline for the population's perception must start well before combat operations occur, preferably during the Phase 0 actions prior to conflict. Failure to establish this baseline creates situations where the United States puts in place many corrective actions without affecting the stability in the region.

Establishing a baseline, identifying the appropriate steps for meeting the individual and group needs, and establishing interagency requirements are actions that can be started during TSC and have a profound impact on how stability operations unfold. Assessing the progress on the stability operations portion of a campaign presupposes several things. There must be definitive objectives associated with each phase of the plan. These objectives must relate to a detectable state that resonates with the population. There must be a designated set of metrics with a full definition of success for each metric. Finally, there must be a capability to identify and collect the data necessary. Unfortunately, the last step identified here is the one most often forgotten during the development of a campaign plan. The process is the same as planning for combat operations, but the data requirements are different. Since the data required is perishable, the plan must include actions that transcend the entire campaign.

The progress of peace operations in not only difficult to measure, the data needed to measure progress is perishable. One of the key measures for stability operations is the perception of the population. This perception changes over time and the metrics must be updated to reflect the change. Developing the baseline for the population's perception must start well before combat operations occur, preferably during Phase 0 operations. Failure to establish this baseline creates situations where the US puts in place many corrective actions without affecting the stability in the region.

Establishing a baseline and identifying the appropriate steps for meeting the individual and group needs are actions that can be started in Phase 0 and have a profound impact on how Phase IV operations unfold. Furthermore, the initial baseline data cannot be recreated at a later date. If this information is not collected and assessed, the best the occupying force can do is to provide the level of support their society deems effective.

Assessing the progress on the stability operations portion of a campaign presupposes several things. There must be definitive objectives associated with each phase of the plan. These objectives must relate to a detectable state that resonates with the population. There must be a designated set of metrics with a full definition of success for each metric. Finally, there must be a capability to identify and collect the data necessary. Unfortunately, the last step identified here is the one most often forgotten during the development of a campaign plan. The process is the same as planning for combat operations, but the data requirements are different. Since the data is perishable, the plan should be developed for Phase 0 that supports Phase IV and V.

<u>Modeling</u>

The analytic community has been using computer models for the last 40 years to gather insights for budget decisions and program development. This experience has enabled analysts to use the tools effectively and understand the shortfalls of each one. The same level of attention has not been provided to the area of stability operations. As a result, the models and tools available for analysis of stability operations are in their infancy. The only way to solve this problem is to understand the shortfalls of the current models, use them in analyses, and improve them iteratively. Unfortunately, the Department of Defense does not have forty years to refine these models.

Assessing stability operations is unlike assessing combat operations. DoD has been modeling combat operations mathematically since the 1920s. Although a model cannot replicate reality, leaders have become comfortable with insights derived from combat modeling. An important factor in this acceptance is that they understand the strengths and weaknesses of the current models. Stability operations demand a different type of model. The behavior of the forces is more important than the structure or combat power. The actions of each party define the outcome of the situation, which ultimately translates to changes in stability in the country. These new models are not widely known in the analytic community, and lack of validation is problematic. However, the decision-maker is going to make a decision regardless of whether the analyst provides input. The job of the analytic community is to support the commander.

Therefore, the analysts must strive to provide the best information possible with applicable caveats, even if it is not the 100% solution.

In combat modeling, there is the ability to aggregate units to higher levels as the scenario grows in size. In stability operations, there is a need to de-aggregate to the lowest level to represent the effects of their presence. This is in part because smaller forces, such as civil affairs teams, have a strategic or operational impact on the outcome of the campaign. In a large scenario, the number of entities rapidly grows beyond the capability of the model. When this happens, the analysis takes far too long to be relevant. For example, the current version of Diamond, a model developed by the United Kingdom, starts to slow down at 600 entities, and in not usable with more than 1300 entities.[29] The Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) is attempting to create a confederation of models to assess stability operations, but so far have not been able to overcome this problem.[30] This problem is not limited to the analytic community: The warfighter must have a tool to assess campaign progress. The lack of understanding necessary to model stability operations also prevents the commander from accurately assessing the progress of the campaign.

A solution to this limitation is to identify the critical indicators of stability. The Interim Semi-Static Stability Model (ISSM) is a meta-model for evaluating the stability of the country. This model applies the principles outlined in <u>Doing Windows</u>, a publication of Hayes and Sands.[31] Hayes and Sands developed a series of measure of performance to assess the stability of a nation through a series of interagency and multinational working groups. These seminars and working groups identified qualitative measures and offered means to quantify the results. The major premise of their work was that the interactions of indicators would define a stable environment. The power of a meta-model for stability operations is the ability to assess interactions of the key indicators. Dr. Dean Hartley adapted the central ideas developed by Hayes and Sands to create an interactive spreadsheet model.[32] Dr. Hartley advanced the model by providing a means to input ongoing actions through a pre-processor and account for outcomes with a post-processor.[33] With the addition of these processors, the ISSM provides an objective method of evaluating progress in a large-scale stability operation.

The ISSM is part of the Flexible Asymmetric Simulation (FAST) Toolbox. The Fast Toolbox provides operational staffs the ability to rapidly perform course of action analysis, support campaign assessment, and share information with organizations outside of the theater.[34] The toolbox consists of a combat simulation, stability operation simulation, database sharing tool, and the ISSM. Together, these tools provide the analytic cells within deployed headquarters the capability to inform the commander throughout the operation. As with any

model, there is a learning curve associated with the use of the models. The FAST toolbox is no different. The tools, especially ISSM, give the Combatant Commander an edge in the conduct of a campaign.

The ISSM tracks stability indicators in a region. Much like the stock market, a small number of items are tracked and the overall performance is developed based on their performance. At best, it is an indicator of future performance. The variables are treated linearly, and the overall stability curve is a grand mean of the nine contributing factors. The variables used to define stability, developed by subject matter experts during several seminars, address the many different areas including infrastructure, government legitimacy, and economics.

Currently, the ISSM serves as a means to track and record relative levels of stability in a country. Ratings for each variable are difficult to calibrate. Therefore, the true power of the model is the ability to compare with the initial baseline data on the country. Historical data, combined with intelligence analysis, serves to build the trends. From there, the analyst can use ISSM to indicate whether the trends are responding positively or negatively to trends. Ultimately, the ISSM provides the ability to develop an audit trail for the determination of quantitative data.

The ISSM is not a predictive model. However, with the series of data collected over time, there is a potential to apply forecasting techniques to estimate the long-term effects of different courses of action. The same caution applies with reference to the calibration of data. The model provides a solution – not necessarily the optimal solution. As long as the results of the ISSM are compared with polling data, the analyst can determine whether the overall stability improves or decreases with the application of courses of action.

Quantifying soft data requires a combination of ranking, rating, and comparison. This process must be objective, consistent, and auditable. The ISSM uses a method to develop a scale, with each level of the scale containing a different word picture describing the situation.[35] While this is an acceptable methodology, it does not resonate with senior leaders. The Measures of Performance (MOP) must be developed to provide factual data that can then be scaled to provide input for the ISSM. One of the weaknesses of using the rating method is that different people will be doing the ratings over time. Although the goal is to create metrics that are totally objective, the translation between qualitative and quantitative data requires subjective decisions by the analyst. Using a tool such as the ISSM helps to reduce the amount of subjectivity introduced into the trend analysis.

No single model can address all of the issues face in stability operations. Even if one were developed, it would not be as effective as a federation of models feeding a meta-model such as ISSM. The factors that contribute to stability cover a broad range of disciplines. However, each of these disciplines has an associated government agency with ongoing efforts to measure performance. Going back to the roles and missions of governmental agencies, the development of measures, models, and simulations need to be assigned during the planning phase.

Ultimately, the planning process for stability operations must be integrated with the warfight. This change requires growth in the cultures of all agencies. The competition between agencies and the protection of each of their power bases must be stopped. NSPD-44 takes initial steps toward this goal. But, as the President takes steps to improve the interagency coordination, the Department of Defense maintains their primacy in the planning arena. The Joint Interagency Coordination Groups in the Regional Combatant Commander planning cells helps bring governmental agencies into the process, but they require the authority to integrate the leadership of other agencies in all phases of the planning process. The formal inclusion of government agencies, and providing the necessary resources, in the initial planning and Phase 0 activities is critical to improvement of the US ability to conduct stability and reconstruction operations.

This paper scratches the surface on several problems associated with stability operations. The United States Government has the capabilities to do stability and reconstruction operations, but needs to adopt measures to improve the deployment time, identify proper resourcing levels, and assign roles to each of the agencies. Planning for stability and reconstruction operations must be integrated from the initiation of the plan. Meanwhile, both the military and government agencies need to identify the proper measures of effectiveness and merit to define success. Finally, the lead agency for stability operations must develop the analytic models needed to assess future plans for stability and reconstruction operations.

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